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Introduction
Dealing with argumentation in natural conversation is difficult. In everyday 
language we use very different meanings for terms like arguing, argument or 
argumentation. Whereas sometimes an argument may refer to a set of logically 
related assertions, at other times it may refer to a single assertion uttered inci-
dentally. The terminology also varies within the sciences and even within the 
same discipline.2 Indeed arguing for teminological unity would be pointless 
because arguing exhibits a variety of functions, thereby necessitating numer-
ous meanings of it. It is a well known fact that even in everyday argumentation 
interactants often utilize technical terms themselves -  e.g., by pointing out this 
or that would not be ‘an argument’, or someone’s argument lacks objectivity’, 
or someone ‘argues unfair’ -  and for that reason a variety of meanings is both 
useful and functional.
In the following sections some research on argumentation in conversa-
tional analysis will be presented, with special emphasis given to the identifica-
tion of argumentation in natural conversation, its sequencing structure, and its 
interactional variation. The considerations are part of a broader study of con-
versational rhetorics in problem and conflict interaction conducted at the Insti-
tute for German Language (IDS) in Mannheim.3 The main goal of this study is 
the analysis and description of interactive practices under a functional rhetori-
cal perspective which is derived from an ethnomethodological approach to the 
study of conversation. Ethnomethodologists have so far mainly looked at the 
organizational order of interaction; conversational rhetorics also investigates 
forms of interactive influence and interactive effects of the participants’ inter-
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active work, e.g. gaining acceptance, or silencing another speech partner. The 
focus thereby is whether the rhetorical impact stems from the organizational 
interactional constraints for establishing conversation and conversational argu-
mentation themselves, and not only from semantic or pragmatic procedures. 
For example, interactants use the requests of turn taking and sequencing to 
force their partners’ utterances in a way they want them to react. Argumenta-
tion as a whole then is a particular rhetorical procedure wherein some other 
procedures of minor order may operate as e.g. ‘demonstrating consistency’, 
‘denying relevance’, ‘denying competence’, or ‘appealing to normativity’.4
Argumentation is described here as an interactively organized sequence. 
The structure of that sequence makes it possible on the one hand to expand 
it extensively, and on the other hand to reduce by means of inferential con-
textual cues. The variability of the argumentative sequence then is one of the 
reasons which makes up its rhetorical power; sequencing therefore is not only 
an organizational function but a rhetorical too.
The data of this study consists of 60 problem and conflict conversations 
from the IDS corpora: authentic counsellings, mediation talks, discussions, and 
even disputations of couples or in families, and also talk shows from TV. They 
are both private conversations and conversations in public institutions. The 
data thus provide for a wide range of types of interaction where argumentation 
occurs.
Background research
Argumentation is a widespread procedure in the Western culture for clarifying 
unclear or controversial matters. After more than two thousand years of logical, 
normative or topological research we can now look at interactive aspects of ar-
gumentation too. This is due to the pragmatic turn of argumentation research 
by Toulmin (1958) and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958; see also Perel- 
man 1980), where the focus of analyses changes from formal logic to the “uses 
of argument” (Toulmin 1958) and argumentation in natural contexts.5 Despite 
the body of research there is still a striking lack of empirical research on argu-
mentation concerning argumentation in natural conversation. The reason for 
this is obvious. Identification of argumentation is already difficult: Where does 
it begin and where does it end? And it is difficult to determine the internal 
structures of argumentation. What are the necessary steps of argumentation 
and what is their sequential organization format? In natural conversation, ar-
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gumentation is often only indicated or is sometimes even hidden strategically 
by the participants.
Two researchers who have dealt with argumentation in natural conversa-
tion are Jackson and Jacobs (see Jackson 8c Jacobs 1980; Jacobs 8c Jackson 1982, 
1989). In an ethnomethodological approach they identify an argument as a 
specific expansion of adjacency pairs.
The expansion may occur either as a presequence (i.e. placed before an 
adjacency pair to prepare it or otherwise to make it superfluous); or as a turn- 
internal expansion (i.e. within one turn of the adjacency pair); or the expan-
sion is an insertion sequence (i.e. between the two steps of the pair); or a 
postsequence (i.e. following an adjacency pair).6
In the view of Jackson and Jacobs argumentative expansions are triggered 
by disagreement. Argumentation therefore is a “disagreement relevant speech 
event” (Jackson 8c Jacobs 1980:254) which is related functionally to the projec-
tion, production and resolution of such a disagreement. The concept of “dis-
agreement” is then tied to the pragmatic concepts of the conversational maxims 
of Grice (Grice 1975) and the felicity conditions of Searle (Searle 1969), which 
means that some of these maxims or conditions are perhaps not accomplished 
and this lack of accomplishment creates disagreement which needs to be clari-
fied argumentatively. This concept of argumentation is strictly related to single 
speech acts; the broader context is neglected.7
Jackson and Jacobs conceptualize argumentative utterances in a microana- 
lytic manner by identifying the sequential properties of verbal activities. Argu-
mentation is seen as established by activities which signal and display disagree-
ment and is -  in an ideal sense -  terminated by that activity which is set condi-
tionally relevant.8 The sequential order then is e.g. ‘question (with implications 
of disagreement in the partner’s view) -  argumentation -  answer’.
Most of the other authors, however, argue from a semantic point of view. 
They postulate dissent or uncertainty as starting points for conversational ar-
gumentation. The termination then depends on an agreement of the interac-
tants to one position, negotiating a compromise, breaking off the argumenta-
tion, or even breaking off the interaction itself. A precise definition of the em-
pirical conversational phenomenon of argumentation, therefore, remains in-
sufficient as are other kinds of some lexical or semanto-pragmatical definitions, 
e.g. causal conjunctions, fall short as an adequate definition for argumentation.
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A conversational rhetorical perspective on argumentation
From a conversational rhetorical perspective argumentation is defined with the 
aid of organizational features which are necessary for the establishment of in-
teraction. In order to describe a wide range of rhetorical practices we therefore 
take into account various dimensions of interaction that have been identified 
by Werner Kallmeyer and Fritz Schütze in a theory of interaction construction 
(see Kallmeyer & Schütze 1976; Kallmeyer 1988; Spranz-Fogasy 1997:27ff). 
According to this theory, interactants have to carry out their conversation by 
simultaneously dealing with different levels of interactional organization:
-  the organizational structure of talk, e.g. the exchange of turns;
-  the thematical organization, where features of presentation like story-
telling, description, etc. are established;
-  the activity organization, where single and complex activities are typified 
(as e.g. an assertion or a counselling conversation);
-  the interactive construction of identities and partner relationships, where 
social roles (mother or daughter, doctor or patient) or social relationships 
(friendship, antagonism) will be defined;
-  the dimension of interactive modalities, where modes such as seriousness 
or play are organized;
-  the establishment of reciprocity, where mutual understanding is ensured.
The efforts to establish these interactional dimensions are always tied to the 
likelihood for the achievement of the speaker’s own goals and the risks to block 
the partners’ goals. Procedures for forcing or supporting partners (e.g. con-
cerning their rights and obligations of participation) have been identified on 
the level of organizational structure and modality organization (Kallmeyer 8c 
Schmitt 1996; Schmitt 1997). In addition the procedures of social position-
ing on the level of the interactive construction of identities and partner rela-
tionships have been revealed (Wolf 1999). Or procedures for establishing or 
blocking perspectives on the level where reciprocity is established have been 
identified (Keim 1996). In this way the procedures for supporting one’s own 
partner or for forcing an action by the partner become evident on the level of 
the organizational structure and the interactional modalities.
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Contextual implementation of argumentation
Interactants begin an argumentation when their thematic exchange encoun-
ters a deficit, i.e. an utterance becomes unclear or controversial.9 The pursuit 
of their conversational goals becomes blocked. The result is that a problem pre-
sentation becomes misunderstandable, a conflict proposal will be rejected, and 
so on. In other words, the practical validity of an utterance, its mutual inter-
active ratification is put in question and practical validity has to be established 
or re-established for the purpose of further achieving common interactional 
goals. The partners therefore have to explain and give reasons for establish-
ing or re-establishing a common view, i.e. a mutual understanding sufficient 
for their interactive goals. Typical kinds of deficits include dissent or uncer-
tainty. Argumentation, then, is an interactive pattern for explaining a position 
and for locally clarifying the deficit and for then integrating the result into the 
‘normal’ course of the current interaction for further comprehensive conversa-
tional work. Formally characterized, argumentation has a three-part structure, 
consisting of initiating, carrying out and reintegrating.
Comprehensive conversational work
Thematical deficit 4
Argumentation
4-
Ongoing comprehensive 
conversational work
Figure 1.
Such a procedure makes sense for an interactional logic too, in fact it is even 
necessary for conversation itself: Both, differences between the interactants and 
lack of knowledge about facts inevitably generate uncertainty or dissent which 
has to be resolved. Therefore there has to be a procedure at work which en-
ables for the conversationalists a common clearing locally with reference to 
comprehensive interactional goals. Obviously there are other practices for the 
solution of such an interactive blockade: interactants may use storytelling, they 
define the blockade as a misunderstanding, or they postpone or even ignore the
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problem. In contrast the argumentation procedure stands out by giving reasons 
and explanations for the problematic position sufficiently until further notice. 
Giving reasons and explanations is necessary up to the point where the inter-
actants may together pursue their general interactive goals which have been 
interrupted by the necessity to argue. Hence, triggering a sequence of turns 
and incorporating the interactively negotiated result of the argumentation se-
quence in a ‘normal’, unproblematic flow of utterances mark the boundaries of 
argumentation in natural conversations.
The interactive practice called argumentation therefore has an external or-
ganizational frame, which initially establishes a clear delimitation concerning 
other activities. And it gains a projective constraint for coming to an end by 
virtue of the superordinate interactive goals. For the interactants this facilitates 
the orientation in the current conversation and makes it possible for them to 
concentrate on the topics they are dealing with.
The internal structure of the argumentation sequence
Argumentation does not only possess the external structure discussed above, 
it also exhibits an internal structure which guarantees the performance of the 
argumentation itself. An example for a simple realization of this argumentation 
sequence is shown in the following segment from a mediation talk on insults, 
damage to property, and bodily harm:10
(1) C: so“ * äh isch glaub den Vorfall ham=ma je 'tz t so weit er
aufzuklären war hie“r mit meinen bescheidenen mittein 
glaub isch habe mer=n aufgeklärt
‘well * ehm I think the incident is clear now as far as it was 
possible to settle it here with my limited means I think we’ve 
solved it’
1 dass also“ 4 sie sich in de Vergangenheit4 solang sie 
zusammen im gleiche haus gewohnt habe net grad be“stens 
vertragen haben
‘in the past when you lived together in one house you did not 
get along with each other’
2 B2: nee des war nu“r die letzte 4 des letzte jahr
‘no this was just the case in the last year we lived together’
3 B2: mir habe ja vorher4 äh parterre gewohnt
‘my husband and I used to live on the ground floor’
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4 C: jaja okay * gut in ordnungfrau neumeier
‘yes okay * that’s okay mrs neumeier’
5 B1: darf isch ihne * hier grad zu ah zu den ausfiihrungen v/ v/ *
yum herrn beck grademal
‘may I say something else concerning the comments of mister 
beck my adversary’
B2: dass mir urn dieses geschprach gebete (...) [.. .  ]
‘that we wanted a discussion to talk things out [ ...]’
Following the contrary presentation of the conflict parties, the mediator C tries 
a more general conflict definition (step 1: in the past when you lived together 
in one house you did not get along with each other), the wife B2 o f the ac-
cused man B1 contradicts (step 2: no this was just the case in the last year we 
lived together) and gives a reason referring to spatial conditions of neighbour-
hood (step 3: my husband and I used to live on the ground floor; i.e. there were 
clashes only during the one year when the apartments of the opposing parties 
were on the same floor) the mediator C accepts that contradiction (step 4: yes 
okay * that’s okay mrs neumeier) whereas the accused B1 realizes further activ-
ities, which all participants deal with then, and which is therefore a ratification 
via continuation (step 5: may I say something else concerning the presentation 
of mr. beck my adversary). This is a -  rather seldomly performed -  clear case 
with an ideal succession of the elements of the argumentation sequence. Em-
pirically, this sequence is most often realized in a more complicated fashion by 
insertion of other activities, e.g., insisting acts (see below).
The prototypical argumentative sequence therefore consists of the follow-
ing steps:
1. triggering
2. marking dissent or problematization
3. presenting new explanatory information
4. acceptance
5. ratification
Steps 1 and 2 are performed by different speakers as steps 4 and 5 too; step 4 
also has to be performed by a different speaker than step 3.
Obviously empirically there are often other reactions than acceptance and 
ratification, for example insisting acts, postponing acts or even an agreement 
on disagreement; reactions which also render possible the return to the su-
perordinate interactive goals. But the sequential structure presented here is
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the prototypical one, around which interactants orient themselves explicitly 
or implicitly.
Variations of the argumentation sequence
The argumentation sequence is very powerful and extremely variable in terms 
of this basic sequence format. Conversationalists may expand it as far as they 
want, or compress it to a minimalistic activity.
Expansion features of argumentation
Expansion of an argumentation sequence may be achieved in two ways de-
pending on how sequences are arranged in the interaction. Expansion may 
be achieved by stringing together or chaining two or more argumentation se-
quences in a serial manner, or by inserting insisting acts to mark dissent or 
problems, or by inserting additional acts that provide reasons or justifications.
Insertion
An argumentation sequence can be expanded by multiple insertions of argu-
mentation sequences, thereby intensifying the branching of the interaction. 
Such branchings or embeddings are regularly tied in a contradicting or con-
trasting manner to the material of prior steps 2 (marking dissent) or 3 (pre-
senting new explicative information).11 Such expansions of the argumentation 
sequence sometimes provide interactional problems: In general, along with in-
sertion the danger of marginalization or dissociation of topics comes up, as 
well as friction in the interpersonal relationship by the face threatening effect 
of iterative critic.
A very simple example for the inserted sequence is the following one, 
which is taken from another mediation talk on injuries (A is the plaintiff, B 
the accused, and C the mediator; the empirical data is reduced to the relevant 
features here).
(2) 1 A: des hot sie a“lles gsa“cht a“lles die na'chbarschaft hota“lles 
ghe“rt i“sch hab zeu“ge
‘she told everything everything the neighbors heard everything 
I have witnesses’
2 B: nein des is tiischt wahr 
‘no that’s not true’
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3 A: diefrau müller war vor ihrm fenschterja die hot alles gehert
‘mrs müller stood at her window she heard that everything’
4 B: diefrau müller hot erseht zum Schluss * desfenschter uffgemacht
‘mrs müller didn’t open the window until the end of our dispute’
5 A: ja die hot=s awer itinedrin gehert sie ware jo devo“r geschdanne
‘well but she heard it from inside you stood directly in front of her 
window’
6 C: frau beck mir halde=s hier so ans nach em annere mir könne
zusamme si'nge awwer mir könne net zusammen re:de“n 
‘mrs beck we want to take turns speaking * we might be able to 
sing together but we can’t talk together at the same time.’
7 A: ja * awer nit abstreite un mi“sch als lügnerin (.. .  ]
‘okay * but she should not contradict and call me as a liar [...]’
Mrs. A states at the beginning that the accused B mentioned all the injuries A 
has listed before (utterance (1)) and she says that she is able to verify this with 
the help of witnesses (utterance (1) and (3)). B contradicts (utterance (2)) and 
a dispute arises then, where both of them tie their objection to the objection 
of the other party (utterances (4) to (5)). The mediator C tries in vain to calm 
the dispute down (utterance (6)) and -  after A’s renewed objection (utterance 
(7)) -  terminates it, by which a new round of argumentation begins. Utterances 
(1) to (3) correspond with the first three steps of the argumentation sequence 
whereas utterances (4) and (5) both operate as step 2, respectively marking 
dissent with the referred utterance in an inserting manner.
Serialization
Another way of building up complex argumentation conversationally is to 
chain two or more argumentation sequences after another. In this way the dif-
ferent positions of the two parties who are arguing become dismantled into 
single aspects. After having considered one aspect, another aspect is addressed 
or re-addressed and is dealt with through argument.
In the same mediation talk cited above the mediator tries to find a com-
monly accepted conflict definition by which he hopes to get a starting point for 
a conflict resolution. While doing this contributions are regularly interrupted 
by objections from the plaintiff A (utterances (1) to (3); the transcription is 
given in a reduced version again):
240
(3) C: also äns steht fescht dass-der streit ghabt habt ne do herrscht 
kän zweifei dra
ok, it is true that you had a quarrel there is no doubt about’
1 A: isch hab ka'n streit mit der fra ghabt sie hot misch beleidischt so
is=es
‘I had no quarrel with that woman * she did insult me that’s it’
C: also disput war uffalle fäll frau beck des steht eindeutisch fescht * 
net * do gibt=s also * nix dran zu rüddeln * äh un die frau kraft 
gibt ja auch einen teil * der beleidigungen * zu: sie räumt 
allerdings ein * dass auch sie“ sie beleidischt hawwe 
‘there was dispute for sure mrs beck and mrs kraft admits the 
insults partially but she also claims that you insulted her too’
2 A: isch ha“b sie net beleidischt isch kumm jo gar net dazu vor lauter
die hot jo so ruffgeschrie mit erhobenen finger als wenn isch e 
Schulkind war
‘I didn’t insult her I didn’t have a chance to insult her because she 
yelled so loud and wagged her finger at me as if I was in school’
C: awwerjetz * jetz * is awwer mol folgendes ihr wohnt jo haus an 
haus newerenanner ihr seht eischjo im grund jeden * tag 
‘but now is the following situation * you live in houses next door 
to each other you see each other every day’
3 A: isch seh se üwwerhaupt nie selde höschens im summer we=ma im
* wenn se in de garde geht
‘I do not see her at all * once in a while in the summer when she 
goes out in the yard’
C: ah ja: awwer irgendwo/ irgendwo sin jo doch berührungspunkt 
‘well okay but somewhere somehow you two bump into each 
other’
Utterances (1) to (3) particularly operate as step 2 of the argumentation se-
quence but every time with a new thematical focus established by the media-
tor C. The new thematical focus therefore establishes a new initial position of 
an argumentation sequence.
Both structurally provided forms of expansion, the insertion and the seri-
alization, are empirically often combined.
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Compressed argumentation
In addition to expansion of an argument sequence, there is also a possibil-
ity to compress the sequence. With that, there is a possibility just to indicate 
argumentation, a possibility to avoid dissent in anticipation, or even a pos-
sibility not to burden the interpersonal relationship. An interactional require-
ment for such a compressed argumentation stems from the interactants’ differ-
ent knowledge, their different interests, or from the fundamental indexicality 
of verbal expressions.12 The ability to anticipate dissent or uncertainty pro-
vides for preceding reasoning -  without an explicit dissent marking utterance 
or problematization. Such compressed argumentation is also based on the or-
ganizational structure of the simple argumentation sequence presented above. 
Although some of the steps of the argumentation sequence are not fully real-
ized, all the relevant components can be reconstructed exactly in the context of 
the realized components (and this is true not only for the analyst but for the 
interactants themselves as well). The anticipation or the imagination of an ob-
jection is treated then as a dissent marker or as a complication, and the speaker 
presents his position in a contrasting manner. Only the contrasting manner in-
dicates that there is an objection or a contradiction just assumed by the speaker. 
Acceptance will be demanded then or just assumed, and the ratification act is 
taken for granted. This is the way that all turn-internally placed reasonings 
operate.
Compressed argumentation differentiates in two significant ways accord-
ing to its interactive functioning: On the one hand avoidance may be exhibited 
by the speaker and on the other hand an offering may be made. Avoiding means 
that one party to the argument gives a reason for his utterances but wishes to 
imply that it is not negotiable, e.g. by encapsulating it in a long utterance with 
particular sequential relevance at the end of the utterance. At other times he 
may even state his point of view explicitly as not negotiable, e.g. by saying T 
won’t discuss that now!’. An example from a counselling interaction on AIDS 
illustrates the avoidance strategy. The reduced version of the interactions is 
given here:
(4) 1 R: ja  ich kann da noch überhaupt noch nich mit ich weiß
überhaupt nich dass es für mich/ was es für mich bedeutet un * 
ja ich merk einfach auch dass ich angst krieg [ . . . ]  manchmal 
schnürts mir einfach die luft ab
T do not know how to handle with * I do not know what it 
means to me when I get scared [... ] sometimes I couldn’t 
breath at all’
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2a/b
2a
2b
3a/b
3a
3b
4
B: also dieses 4äh positiv sein womöglich auch schon 4krank 
ich mein des is ja 4  jetz noch nich sicher die 4  d l dl äh muss 
ja 4 denk ich erst vom arzt noch abgeklärt werden 4 äh des 
4  is ja ne sache die * gar nich im Zusammenhang stehen 
muss jetz also des 4 äh des positive testergebnis 4  is ja noch 
4  überhaupt keine 4  äh aussage darüber ob jetz 4  die 
krankheit schon vorhanden is ne positiv sein heißt nicht 
dass 4 aids*krank * äh äh jemand is 4  s=is emal-n status 
4  vorläufig
B: ‘well your being positive or even ill/1 mean * it is not even 
certain and has to be diagnosed by your doctor * ehm * 
there doesn’t have to be a connection * ’
‘you know a positive test does not mean that you’ve got aids 
it is just a provisional state’
R: ja aber 4  jetz kommen so die 4  die anzeichen die ersten 
Sachen 4 wo 4 mein arzt mir eben gesacht h a t 4 das sind 
alles begleiterscheinungen und 4ja ich ich weiß auch 4  also 
ich will da mit andern leuten drüber reden die 4  auch 
betroffen sind weil ich denke da wird ich besser verstanden 
R: ‘well but the first signs are those where my doctor told me 
they are all related symptoms * I know too/ *’
‘well I just want to talk about it with others who are also 
infected because I think they have a better understanding’
B: sicherlich 4  äh d a s 4 gedankenaustausch mit betroffenen 
äh 4  is auf alle fälle gut
‘certainly you are right * ehm * an exchange of ideas with 
persons who are also infected is good in any case’
The client (R) here first formulates his fear of his HIV-infection ((1): I do not 
know how to handle with * I do not know what it means to me when I get 
scared [...] sometimes I couldn’t breath at all). The counsellor responds but 
downplays the possibility of an AIDS disease, and gives a reason ((2a): well 
your being positive or even ill/ I mean * it is not even certain and has to be 
diagnosed by your doctor * ehm 4 there doesn’t have to be a connection). Be-
fore relinquishing the turn to his partner he states definitely that HIV-infection 
does not mean the AIDS-disease itself; by putting this statement in the last po-
sition of the turn-serialization he demands his partner’s ratification or even 
acceptance of that statement first. In this way he pushes his argument to the 
background ((2b): you know a positive test does not mean that you’ve got aids 
it is just a provisional state). But R rejects the statement and refers to his doctor
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as a competent authority ((3a): well but the first signs are those where my doc-
tor told me they are all related symptoms * I know too/). Then he immediately 
downplays the open dissent and renews a prior request ((3b): well I just want 
to talk about it with others who are also infected because I think they have a 
better understanding). R’s rejection therefore is encapsulated in the same way 
as is his reference to competence. Actually B deals in the following statement 
with the renewed request and does not insist on his prior statement ((4): cer-
tainly you are right * ehm * an exchange of ideas with persons who are also 
infected is good in any case).
The manner of offering compressed argumentation explicitly or implicitly 
offers a verbal reason as a questionable one for interactive negotiation (by say-
ing e.g. ‘we have to discuss it’). In the following extract from another mediation 
talk on verbal insults the accused denies having used any insulting expressions. 
The mediator concedes that ‘as a rule’ but characterizes the incriminated inci-
dent as an ‘exceptional situation’. By doing so he substantiates in anticipation 
why rejection may be critical for the accused: there were witnesses who can 
substantiate the plaintiff’s statement. The relevant steps of the argumentation 
sequence are realized in this compressed manner and are offered to the accused 
for further discussion:
(5) B: solche solche Wörter-gebrauche ich nicht 
‘I don’t use expressions like that’
C: ich nehme ihnen ab daß sie die nischtgebrauchen im regelfall * a:ber * 
äh in einer ausnah:mesituation herr kreuzer könnte des doch durschaus 
mal sei“n * un * äh * hie“r * is ja die * der antragssteiler * in einer 
etwas besseren läge ihnen gegenüber indem er nämlisch einen zeu” gen 
aufbieten kann
‘I believe that you do not use such expression as a rule but isn’t it pos-
sible * in an exceptional situation mister kreuzer * that this could be 
* and * ehm * here the plaintiff is in a slightly better position because 
he has a witness’
The reference to an ‘exceptional situation’ can be seen as marking dissent to 
the rejection of the accusation whereas the mediator’s reference to witnesses 
may be regarded as an explication in the sense of step 3 of the argumentation 
sequence. The accused now has to deal with this unfavorable matter. But he 
simply rejects the validity of the assertion stated by the mediator and by that 
the validity of the accusation too, for which he himself offers an explanation of 
his own stating that it is ‘pure insinuation’:
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(6) B: ja * sie wissen ja auch was das ich ihnen geschrieben habe * äh daß 
erstens gar kein zeuge da war und ich darauf besteh daß es eine reine 
Unterstellung ist von dem herrn * heinzel
‘well * you also know what I wrote * ehm that there was no witness 
there at all and that I insist that it is a pure insinuation by mister 
heinzel’
The accused therefore rejects negotiation of the mediator’s explicative offer 
(see C’s utterance in example 5). In the following section the mediator tries to 
prove contradictions in the presentation of the accused as a more competitive 
strategy.
Expansion and compression are frequently combined in different forms. 
With these formats a complementary and very variable and process-sensitive 
potential for complex argumentation is given which provides for the establish-
ment and the solution of argumentation in different contexts.
Summary
Argumentation is shown here as an interactional resource of interactants in 
conversations. Interactants may leave their main interactive goals for a short 
time or even longer by implementing an argumentation sequence. Within this 
sequence and by means of the organizational structure they are able to cope 
with their problem of understanding, and return again to the previous level 
of interaction. This is due to the implementation format and the internal 
structuring of the argumentation sequence which provides a comprehensive 
projection by its organizational constraints.
Interactants gain interactive control by that procedure because it is bound 
to the comprehensive goals, and it is maximally flexible through expansion or 
compression of the sequence. Interactants may use minimal activities, or ex-
pand an argument at length without losing the thread of the interaction. Argu-
mentation, therefore, is enacted in a range from a single parenthesis to hours of 
discussion. All of this makes argumentation a highly practicable procedure and 
this may explain its frequency, its dissemination in different contexts and types 
of interaction, and last but not least its high acknowledgment in the Western 
conversational culture.13
Sequentiality, as it is shown for argumentation here, therefore, is not only 
a merely formal organizational structure. It provides for resources for the pro-
duction of utterances and for mutual reference of the partners with a lot of
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rhetorical implications. The rhetorical implications of the argumentation se-
quence are enormous: initiators of argumentation provide space for presenting 
their position, which conversely forces their partners to argue too. But there are 
also risks. For example, the partner’s position may ultimately result in success. 
One must also bear the following in mind when considering argumentation 
sequences: there is no truth in an interaction besides what partners define as 
true -  and for that negotiation, argumentation as well as its sequencing, and its 
interactional variation are very powerful instruments.
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1. I wish to thank Sara Smith (California State University) and Tom Lovik (Michigan State 
University) for their comments and their help with the translation.
2. See for example Klein (1981) who defines ,an argument as a number of assertions con-
nected in a certain (‘logical’) way’ (p. 226; all translations from the author); otherwise 
Kienpointner (1996) says anargument is a reason given for or against a hypothesis’ (p. 75).
3. See Kallmeyer 1996; Keim 1996, 1999, i.pr., Schmitt 1997; Wolf 1999; Spranz-Fogasy i.pr. 
and Spranz-Fogasy 2002.
4. These procedures are described in Spranz-Fogasy 1999 und Spranz-Fogasy 2002. They 
are derived from argumentative criteria, whose relevance the interactants themselves deter-
mine within their argumentative utterances.
5. For an overview see Pander Maat 1984 and Nussbaumer 1995; for the pragma-dialectic 
approach of the Amsterdam school see Eemeren et al. 1993.
6. For these expansion formats see Jefferson 1972 and Jefferson 8c Schenkein 1978.
7. In later articles (e.g. in Jacobs et al. 1991) they both postulate the interrelationship of ar-
gumentation and the comprehensive conversational work, but do not analyze it empirically. 
And it must be stated that, by tying argumentation to the Gricean conversational maxims 
and the felicity conditions of Searle, they develop a normativistic view on argumentation 
and thereby dissolve the prior strict sequential approach (see Jacobs 1999).
8. For the concept of conditional relevance see Schegloff 8e Sacks 1973. Conditional rele-
vance means the kind of projection or provisional structuring of an verbal activity by the 
previous activity: Enacting a particular type of an activity sets a following activity relevant 
and makes it expectable. Typical examples are adjacency pairs such as question-answer.
9. More general definitions of interactional argumentation deal with just .giving a reason’ 
without reference to any kind of interactive incident. But in an interactional point of view 
accounts as argumentations or e.g. narratives always deal with deficits at least in the sense of 
uncertainties (see Kallmeyer 8i Schutze 1977).
10. The transcript is fully printed in Schroder (1995). Translations of the transcripts are 
from the author; they are rough translations with the focus on the argumentative aspects.
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11. Sometimes even acceptance or ratification also cause a further insertion as the following 
scene from a TV discussion between two German politicians, the late physicist Robert Jungk 
and the former minister of defense Rupert Scholz, demonstrates. Scholz demands consensus 
and Jungk nods to the demand. Scholz then states consensus but Jungk denies: no I do not 
have any consensus with you (nein ich hab mit ihnen überhau’pt keinen konsens)( 12.2.1991, 
N3: Alex. Das aktuelle Kulturstudio).
12. For the concept of indexicality see Garfinkel 8c Sacks 1976, Patzelt 1987. Indexicality is 
seen as an unavoidable quality of the meaning of verbal expressions to depend on the given 
context.
13. Argumentation is one of the most examined communication forms of the Western 
world, as to be seen in the amount of writings of Aristoteles (e.g. 1952, 1980), Toulmin 
(1958), Perelman (1980), or the Amsterdam School of Pragma-dialectics (Eemeren et al. 
1993) etc.
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Appendix. Transcription conventions
[... ] omissions
( ...)  incomprehensible
, ** micropause
: lenghtening
emphasis
/ breaking off
